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Bank Directors Beware: Post-Crisis Bank Director
Liability
I. INTRODUCTION
The average corporation in twenty-first century America is
becoming startlingly similar to an eighteenth century European pirate
crew. Described by one historian as “sea-going stock compan[ies],”
pirate ships featured elected captains and officers.1 Despite pop-culture
depictions of pirate captains as tyrannical, monstrous figures with hook
hands and a suspiciously large cut of the plundered booty, these
captains and officers in fact often served entirely at the pleasure of their
pirate crews.2 The pirate captains were often held liable and penalized
for poor judgment, behavior that the crew felt did not serve its interests,
or, in Captain Charles Vane’s case, plain old-fashioned cowardice.3
Today, corporations, including banks, are becoming much more
like these pirates’ sea-going stock companies by increasingly holding
members of their boards of directors personally liable.4 Although
holding bank directors liable for decisions made in their official
capacity does not result in the same penalties that pirate captains
received, the punishment of personal liability has been increasingly
used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in the past
few decades and since the 2008 financial crisis in particular.5
This Note examines the most recent wave of personal liability
for bank directors regarding decisions made in their official capacity, as
well as the implications that this trend may have on bank directors and
shareholders. Part II discusses FDIC claims against bank directors,
including the FDIC claim process, the applicable law, and the standard
1. Peter T. Leeson, An-aargh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization,
115 U. CHI. J. POL. ECON. 1049, 1064–67 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS 1 (2014) (stating
that between January 1, 2009, and December 19, 2014, the FDIC has authorized suits
“against 1181 individuals for D&O liability,” including “104 filed D&O lawsuits . . .
naming 793 former directors and officers”).
5. Id.
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of care in director liability cases.6 Part III details the trend prior to the
2008 financial crisis in bank director personal liability in enforcement
actions.7 Part IV examines the post-2008 financial crisis trend in bank
director personal liability in enforcement actions and details the
characteristics of many post-crisis claims.8 Part V discusses methods
that banks use to protect their directors from personal liability, including
indemnification agreements and director and officer liability insurance
policies (“D&O insurance”).9 Part VI addresses the potential effects of
holding directors personally liable, both from the directors’ and
shareholders’ perspectives.10 Finally, Part VII concludes by considering
the overall impact of director personal liability and discussing a
potential alternative to holding directors personally liable.11
II. FDIC CLAIMS AGAINST BANK DIRECTORS
When a federally insured bank fails, the FDIC is appointed as
receiver by the bank’s regulator, which is determined by the bank’s
charter.12 The FDIC also covers the losses resulting from the bank’s
collapse in order to limit risks to the deposit insurance fund and the
effect of the bank’s failure on the financial system.13 As receiver, the
FDIC conducts investigations into the bank’s failure and, if necessary
and prudent, brings professional liability suits against the failed bank’s
former directors and officers on behalf of the bank itself.14 The FDIC
can hold directors personally liable for gross negligence or conduct that
exceeds gross negligence,15 and therefore, a bank director is required to
act as a “prudent and diligent business person.”16 While gross
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See infra Part VII.
12. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, ch. 7 (2003).
13. Id.
14. ANJALI C. DAS, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, CLIENT

ALERT: NEW FDIC LAWSUITS ATTACK FORMER BANK D&OS 2 (May 2011), available at
http://www.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Legal_Analysis/ins_fdic_may11.pdf.
15. Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (West 2013).
16. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-87-92, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BANK DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1992), available at
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3300.html.
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negligence is the stated standard of care, in practice, many FDIC
professional liability suits bring claims under a lower standard of simple
negligence.17 The most common claims brought by the FDIC against
directors of failed banks allege the following: “(i) dishonest conduct or
abusive insider transactions; (ii) violations of internal policies, law, or
regulations that resulted in a safety or soundness violation; or (iii)
failure to establish, monitor, or follow proper underwriting procedures,
or heed warnings from regulators or advisors.”18
A.

The FDIC Claim Process

The first step in the FDIC receivership process is for the bank’s
chartering authority to close the bank and to name the FDIC as the
receiver.19 The appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a bank is not
mandatory, but may occur for a number of reasons, including a bank’s
maintenance
of
insufficient
assets
for
obligations
or
20
undercapitalization. After the FDIC is named as the receiver, the
FDIC leads an investigation into the financial institution.21 If this
investigation uncovers material that warrants an FDIC claim and any
attempted settlements between the FDIC and the director fail, the
potential claim goes to the FDIC’s Board of Directors (“FDIC Board”)
for consideration.22 If the FDIC Board decides to pursue action against
the director or the financial institution, the FDIC will file a claim in
federal court.23
Before filing the claim in court, the FDIC must first consider
two questions in order to justify the suit: (1) whether success on the
claim is more likely than not, and (2) whether pursuing the claim will be
17. AABD Survey Result on Measuring Bank Director Fear of Personal Liability Are
Not Good News, AM. ASS’N OF BANK DIRECTORS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://aabd.org/aabdsurvey-results-measuring-bank-director-fear-personal-liability-good-news/.
18. Mary C. Gill et al., Claims Against Bank Directors and Officers Arising From the
Financial Crisis, 26 REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 69, 70 (2010).
19. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(5), (2)(A)(ii); DONNA L. WILSON & KRISTOPHER KNABE,
BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, FDIC BANK FAILURE LITIGATION: UNDERSTANDING AND
NAVIGATING THE FDIC’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND MORTGAGE FRAUD SUITS 3–4 (Apr.
18, 2012).
20. WILSON & KNABE, supra note 19 (citing 12 U.S.C.A. §1821(c)(5)).
21. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 16, at 2 (referencing FDIA § 884, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1821).
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id.
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cost effective.24 In assessing the likelihood of success, the FDIC
conducts a thorough interview of the factual circumstances surrounding
the claim.25 In assessing whether pursuing the claim is likely to be cost
effective, the FDIC investigates potential recovery award assets, such as
the bank’s D&O insurance coverage and the director’s personal assets.26
The FDIC only pursues claims where the recovery is expected to justify
the costs of investigation and litigation.27 Therefore, D&O insurance is
an important consideration since directors often do not have sufficient
personal assets to cover FDIC claims.28
B.

Applicable Law and Standard of Care

Before the savings and loan crisis (“S&L crisis”) in the mid1980s, the spotlight on bank and S&L directors’ activities was not as
blinding as it is today.29 After many depository institutions failed
during the S&L crisis, consumers and the market looked for answers
and the FDIC focused more on directors.30 To protect directors and
officers from this new scrutiny, states passed statutes that raised the
standard of care to gross negligence for bank director and officer
personal liability.31 Statutes like these, referred to as “insulating
statutes,” offer directors extra coverage by requiring that parties,
including the FDIC, bringing action against them, prove a “disregard for
a director’s duties or an extreme deviation from expected behavior,” as
opposed to the previous, lower standard of ordinary negligence.32
Id.
Id.
DAS, supra note 14, at 2.
THOMAS P. VARTANIAN & ROBERT H. LEDIG, DECHERT LLP, BANK D&O DEFENSE
MANUAL 6 (May 2012), available at http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/7f7fad0c600b-4f85-8cab-461dc3e08b49/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0f32f58c-b774-4c959c37-118103b6d303/Bank%20DO%20Defense%20Manual_May2012.pdf.
28. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE
271 (1998).
29. See generally Ronald W. Stevens, FDIC Lawsuits Against Former Directors and
Officers of Banks That Have Failed Since 2008: Is This Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 97
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 762 (Nov. 1, 2011).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Benjamin Saul, Know the Standard of FDIC Liability for Community Banks
Portfolio
Media
Inc.,
LAW360
(Feb.
5,
2013,
9:48
AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/411958/know-the-standard-of-fdic-liability-forcommunity-banks.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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Delaware statutes demonstrate this protective approach,
imposing only two basic fiduciary duties on directors and officers: the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.33 The duty of care requires that
directors execute their duties in good faith, with the same level of care
that an ordinarily prudent director would use,34 and “in a manner [the
director] believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”35
Similarly, the duty of loyalty requires directors to act on behalf of the
corporation,36 and refrain from “self-dealing, usurpation of corporate
opportunity, and any acts that would permit them to receive an improper
personal benefit or injure their constituencies.”37
In 1989, Congress responded to these insulating statutes by
passing the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement
Act (“FIRREA”).38 Included in FIRREA was the authorization for the
FDIC to hold directors personally liable for gross negligence.39
FIRREA preempts the insulating statutes in FDIC claims on behalf of
state-chartered banks.40 While there was disagreement over whether
FIRREA’s new standard also applied to federally-chartered banks,41 the
Supreme Court ultimately resolved this disagreement in 1997, holding
that state law dictates the applicable standard.42 Therefore, FIRREA
can only impose a lower bar for personal liability suits in FDIC claims
on behalf of state-chartered banks.43 As a result, the FDIC is permitted
to pursue claims against directors of federally chartered banks even
under simple negligence if state law allows it.44
While directors may face liability under either state law or the
33. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367–68 (Del. 1993).
34. Id.
35. Stevens, supra note 29 (quoting Calif. Corp. Code § 309(a)).
36. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
37. LATHAM & WATKINS, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND POTENTIAL LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS OF FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS 2 (June 2003), available at
http://iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/393/1422.html.
38. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.); VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27, at 5.
39. VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27, at 5 (referencing Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (FDIA) § 884(k), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (West 2013).
40. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992), en
banc, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 993 (1992).
41. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 275.
42. Atherton v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 227–28 (1997).
43. See Atherton v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 227–28 (1997).
44. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS, supra note 4.
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FIRREA standard, the common law business judgment rule45 helps
protect directors of both state and federally chartered banks who face
FDIC claims.46 The business judgment rule provides a presumption that
absent any self-interest, directors making a business decision are acting
in good faith and with due care.47 The rule has often been used to shield
directors against FDIC claims of negligence or breach of fiduciary
duty.48 Because it bestows a strong presumption of good faith and due
care upon directors, even director decisions that have proven disastrous
can be protected if the director reasonably believed it was in the
corporation’s best interest at the time.49
In FDIC as Receiver for Cooperative Bank v. Willetts,50 for
example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that the business judgment rule completely
protected a group of bank directors and officers that had been sued by
the FDIC.51 In 2006, Cooperative Bank (“Cooperative”), based in
Wilmington, North Carolina, earned a CAMELS “2” rating, which
indicates a fundamentally sound firm with only moderate weaknesses.52
Cooperative was downgraded to a CAMELS “5” rating in 2008 and was
closed in 2009.53 After coming under FDIC receivership, the FDIC
sued nine of Cooperative’s directors and officers, alleging negligence,
gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty regarding imprudent
lending practices.54 Stating that the business judgment rule defeated the
FDIC’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims and that there
was “no gross negligence on the part of Cooperative’s directors and
45. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES § 2:12 (2014).
46. VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27.
47. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 45.
48. VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra note 27, at 8.
49. Id.
50. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Willets, No. 7:11-cv-00165-BO (E.D.N.C. Sept. 11,
2014), ECF No. 124; see also CAMDEN R. WEBB & KACEY L. HUNT, WILLIAMS MULLEN,
CLIENT ALERT: FDIC V. WILLETS (Nov. 10, 2014).
51. WEBB & HUNT, supra note 50, at 5.
52. Id. at 2. Banks receive composite ratings known as “CAMELS,” based on six
factors: (1) capital adequacy; (2) asset quality; (3) management; (4) earnings; (5) liquidity;
and (6) sensitivity to market risk. CAMELS ratings range from one, which represents “the
strongest performance and risk management practices” to five, which signals a high level of
concern regarding management practices and performance. COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS 9 (2007).
53. WEBB & HUNT, supra note 50, at 5.
54. Id. at 3.
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officers,” the court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the
directors and officers.55 The combination of the business judgment rule
and adherence to Cooperative’s internal lending policies by directors
and officers combined to create a strong presumption of innocence for
the directors and officers.56 Cooperative’s case signals the strong level
of protection the business judgment rule can provide directors in an
otherwise unforgiving post-crisis personal liability landscape.57
III. PRE-CRISIS TREND IN REGULATION
Before the 1980s, bank director liability suits were not so
common.58 In fact, the FDIC initially had no receivership staff
dedicated to professional liability issues.59 Following the S&L crisis,
however, FDIC and Resolution Trust Corporation60 lawsuits against
directors and officers increased.61 Between the early 1980s and the mid1990s, the FDIC filed more than 800 professional liability lawsuits after
more than 1,600 FDIC-insured depository institutions failed.62
Ultimately, between 1986 and 1996, the FDIC and RTC collected more
than $5 billion, with $1.3 billion of that total coming from claims
against directors and officers.63 As a result of this increase in
professional liability suits, the FDIC created a full-time receivership
staff dedicated entirely to professional liability issues.64
Despite a late-1990s lull, the early 2000s brought an increase in
the number of professional liability suits once again, this time as a result
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 268.
Id.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
established the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) with the objectives of managing and
resolving cases related to depository institutions and maximizing the value generated from
the liquidation of depository institutions. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 501(a), 103 Stat. 183, 363. The
RTC was abolished in 1991, Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 310, 105 Stat. 1761, 1769, and it’s
corporate functions were terminated pursuant to the Resolution Trust Corporation
Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-204, 107 Stat. 2369, 2369 (1993).
61. See generally Stevens, supra note 29.
62. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 270.
63. Id. at 285.
64. Id. at 268.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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of accounting fraud scandals.65 In the early 2000s, corporations and
banks like Enron and Superior Bank, as well as their auditing firms such
as Arthur Andersen and Ernst & Young, were accused of accounting
fraud.66 For example, after Superior Bank was closed and put into
receivership by the FDIC in 2001, the Office of Thrift Supervision cited
improper accounting, poor lending practices, and ineffective
management supervision as contributing factors in the bank’s failure.67
The FDIC brought suit against Superior Bank’s accounting firm, Ernst
& Young, for $2 billion.68 Fearing a lawsuit against themselves as well,
the bank’s owners, the Pritzker family, settled with the FDIC for an
immediate payment of $100 million and an additional $360 million over
the subsequent fifteen years.69 Accounting fraud scandals like this
sparked an increase in professional liability suits in the early 2000s and
renewed the fear of director liability.70
IV. CURRENT TREND IN REGULATIONS AND COMMON CHARACTERISTICS
OF RECENT FDIC CLAIMS
By 2007, some suggested that the increased-liability wave that
began after the accounting scandals of the early 2000s was fading away
and an era of decreased personal liability for directors was finally
returning.71 The increased-liability atmosphere returned once again,
however, at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis,72 with a spike in
the number of FDIC professional liability lawsuits following a surge in
bank failures.73 In total, the FDIC has named 749 directors and officers

65. Id. at 271.
66. John McCormick, Pritzker’s Superior Bank Subprime Losses Blemish Resume,

BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-22/pritzker-ssuperior-bank-subprime-losses-blemish-resume.html.
67. Id.
68. David Moberg, Breaking the Bank, IN THESE TIMES (Nov. 8, 2002),
http://inthesetimes.com/issue/27/01/feature2.shtml.
69. Id.
70. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 28, at 271.
71. Delaware Courts Again Are Safe Haven for D&Os, ACE GROUP (Jan. 2007),
http://www.acegroup.com/bm-en/media-centre/delaware-courts-again-are-safe-haven-fordos.aspx.
72. Thomas P. Vartanian et al., Enforcement Actions Continue Three-Year Decline;
DOJ Emerges as Major Player, 102 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 947, 947–953 (May 20,
2014).
73. Id.
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in ninety-seven lawsuits since 2009.74 The aggregate settlements
obtained not only from lawsuits pursued by the FDIC and RTC, but also
from claims against directors and officers that did not result in a filed
complaint, is approximately $330 million.75
FDIC professional liability claims against former directors of
failed banks since the 2008 financial crisis share common
characteristics, including the named defendants, damages sought, and
the amount that directors have paid out-of-pocket from judgments and
settlements.76 Although the number of bank failures per year has
decreased since 2010, the number of professional liability suits against
directors and officers peaked in 2013 at fifty-three.77 This is likely due
to the FDIC’s statute of limitations on professional liability claims—
three years for tort claims and six years for contract claims—which can
be extended if state law permits a longer period of time.78
While a statute of limitations could hamper FDIC professional
liability claims in some circumstances, the FDIC has an additional tool:
“tolling agreements.”79 Tolling agreements provide the FDIC an
additional year after the expiration of the statute of limitations to
determine whether it will file a lawsuit following a bank’s failure.80
Tolling agreements are often agreed to by potential defendants in order
to allow more time for the parties to reach a pre-litigation settlement
and avoid trial altogether.81 As a result, these agreements are a valuable
option for the FDIC because of the lengthy and costly nature of
litigation.82 The FDIC’s authority to extend the statute of limitations
arises out of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which allows the FDIC

WEBB & HUNT, supra note 50.
ABE CHERNIN ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, CHARACTERISTICS OF FDIC
LAWSUITS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (2013).
76. See generally id.
77. Vartanian et al., supra note 72, at 6.
78. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS, supra note 4, at 1; VARTANIAN & LEDIG, supra
note 27, at 8.
79. Emily Atkin, FDIC Amping Up Suits Against Failed Bank Execs, LAW360 (Sept.
16, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/473008/fdic-amping-up-suits-againstfailed-bank-execs.
80. Id.
81. OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-CA-14-012, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST INSTITUTION-AFFILIATED PARTIES AND
INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH FAILED INSTITUTIONS 30 (July 2014).
82. Susan N.K. Gummow, Back to the Future: FDIC Litigation Has Returned,
RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 1, 26 (2011).
74.
75.
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to both extend running statutes of limitation as well as “revive an
expired statute of limitations in select cases, including claims involving
alleged fraud or intentional misconduct.”83
While professional liability claims since the 2008 financial
crisis have been as high as $600 million each, the majority of these
claims have been for amounts less than $20 million.84 These claims are
pursued in part to recoup any losses incurred by the FDIC deposit
insurance fund when it stepped in to cover a failed bank’s obligations.85
In aggregate, between 2007 and 2013, 471 bank failures in the United
States have resulted in a $92.5 billion hit to the FDIC’s deposit
insurance fund.86 In order to mitigate these losses, the FDIC prefers to
reach settlements with banks and their directors, rather than pursue
litigation against them.87
While the FDIC’s preference for settlement may save litigation
costs, the secrecy surrounding these post-financial crisis settlements has
received some criticism.88 In what the Los Angeles Times described as
“a major policy shift from previous crises, when the FDIC trumpeted
punitive actions against banks as a deterrent to others,” FDIC settlement
agreements have begun to include “no press release” clauses.89 These
clauses promise that the FDIC will not engage in publicity regarding the
settlement terms.90 Although the FDIC cannot legally keep details of its
settlement amounts secret, these clauses allow directors to minimize
damages and avoid admitting wrongdoing.91 The “no press release”
clauses also mean that the settlements are not “trumpeted” as they were
following the S&L crisis.92 Consequently, these settlements do not
provide the deterrent force that may result from a publicized

83. Joshua Glazov, When the FDIC Takes over a Failed Bank: Business Pitfalls and
Opportunities, MUCH SHELIST (May 12, 2010), http://www.muchshelist.com/knowledgecenter/article/business-pitfalls-and-opportunities-when-the-fdic-takes-over-a-failed-bank.
84. CHERNIN ET AL., supra note 75, at 10.
85. E. Scott Reckard, In Major Policy Shift, Scores of FDIC Settlements Go
Unannounced,
L.A.TIMES
(Mar.
11,
2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/11/business/la-fi-fdic-settlements-20130311.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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settlement.93
Although personal contributions by directors in
these
settlements are often negotiated away or covered by D&O insurance
policies,94 there is still a risk that directors may have to pay out-ofpocket.95 Of the forty-four agreements involving directors and officers
filed between January 2008 and April 2013, 39% required payments by
directors and officers out of pocket, for an aggregate of $8 million.96
These personal contributions were often in addition to payments made
by insurance providers,97 as in the case of IndyMac and Washington
Mutual.98 One former IndyMac CEO’s recent settlement with the FDIC
was reportedly $12 million, with $1 million of that amount designated
to come from the officer’s personal funds, and the remaining $11
million to be covered by D&O insurance.99 In another settlement
reached between the FDIC and three Washington Mutual officers, the
officers were required to pay out-of-pocket a combined $400,000 of the
total $64 million settlement agreement.100 Although these examples
detail settlements regarding officers, directors have experienced similar
settlements.101 In a 2012 settlement with the FDIC, Downey Financial
Corporation’s former board chairman and co-founder, Maurice
McAlister, agreed to pay $1.93 million out-of-pocket, with other
Downey insiders agreeing to pay an additional combined $1.75
million.102 The bank’s insurer paid an additional $28.4 million.103
Id.
JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, DIRECTOR AND OFFICER
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE—ISSUES FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES TO CONSIDER 3 (2013).
95. Chris Cumming, Liability Concerns Impede Director Recruitment at Banks, AM.
BANKER (Apr. 17, 2014, 3:43 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_75/liabilityconcerns-impede-director-recruitment-at-banks-1066974-1.html.
96. CHERNIN ET AL., supra note 75, at 2.
97. Id. at 11.
98. Paul Shukovsky, FDIC Settles with Former WaMu Executives for $64 Million;
Personal Loss Said Minimal, 97 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1042, 1042 (Dec. 14,
2011).
99. VORYS, CLIENT ALERT: PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE FDIC; THE INDYMAC
DECISION (Jan. 2, 2013).
100. Louise Story, Ex-Bank Executives Settle F.D.I.C. Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2011, at B5.
101. William K. Black, Which Aspect of the FDIC’s Litigation Failures is the Most
Embarrassing and Damaging, NEW ECON. PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2013/03/which-aspect-of-the-fdics-litigation-failuresis-the-most-embarrassing-and-damaging.html.
102. Id.
103. Id.
93.
94.
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V. BANKS’ INSULATION OF DIRECTORS FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY
The first line of defense available to directors is an
indemnification agreement, with D&O insurance serving as the second
line of defense.104 Most banks elect to use both an indemnification
agreement and D&O insurance policy to insulate directors from
personal liability.105 As a prerequisite to accepting a director position at
a bank, many directors seek assurance that their personal assets are
protected by not only the promise of indemnification from the
corporation but also a D&O insurance policy from an external insurance
company.106 The two forms of coverage are typically designed to work
in conjunction, with the standard D&O policy presuming that the bank
will first provide a director the maximum amount of indemnification
legally allowed by the law of the bank’s state of incorporation, and with
the D&O policy supplementing any claim that the director is not
indemnified against.107 The combination of these two mechanisms
provide directors with broad and thorough coverage against personal
liability because the D&O policy will fill any gaps in the
indemnification policy’s first line of defense.108
A.

Indemnification Agreements

Indemnification agreements function separately from the typical
indemnification provision contained in a bank’s bylaws.109
Indemnification agreements create a stronger contractual obligation
between the director and the bank so that the bank will indemnify a
director “whose conduct meets the applicable standard” and advance
expenses to the director for her defense against professional liability
104. Joanna Page, Roundtable: Risks Facing Directors and Officers, FINANCIER
WORLDWIDE MAG., Aug. 2013, at 9 (quoting Leslie Kurshan).
105. Theodore J. Sawicki et al., Not Just Belt and Suspenders: Indemnification
Agreements and State Corporate Law, 42 BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 607, 609
(2009).
106. Jeanne Oronzio Wermuth, Why Purchase Side ‘A’ Directors & Officers Liability
Coverage?, INS. J., June 18, 2012, at N4, 1.
107. SARAH TURPIN & FRANK THOMPSON, K&L GATES, DIRECTORS IN CRISIS 27 (2012),
available
at
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/7b5d50b9-8570-4759-aa60121d2960a94e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/666b0ad2-7697-4dca-999e1930b415e6d9/CDR_Nov_Dec_2012.pdf.
108. OLSON ET AL., supra note 94.
109. Sawicki et al., supra note 105, at 609.
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claims.110 While a bank may promise in its organizational documents to
provide directors the maximum indemnification allowed under state
law, in extreme circumstances, these bylaws may be amended by
shareholder approval, thus potentially amending the indemnification
provided within them.111 This risk may be particularly high when the
indemnified director no longer sits on the board.112 By having a
separate indemnification agreement, both current and former directors
do not have to worry that the indemnification contained in the bylaws
may be pulled out from underneath them.113
Indemnification agreements also clarify how indemnification
provisions included in state law function in the real world.114 State law
generally provides corporations broad license to indemnify directors.115
For example, Delaware general corporation law permits director
indemnification subject to two basic conditions: (1) good faith; and (2)
reasonable belief by the director that the conduct was lawful and in the
corporation’s best interests.116 However, case law regarding dispute
resolution in the event of an indemnification dispute and whether
corporations are required to purchase D&O insurance is underdeveloped
in states other than Delaware.117 Therefore, a separate indemnification
agreement can clarify details should the company have to indemnify the
director.118
B.

D&O Insurance Policies

D&O insurance was first introduced in the 1930s when state law
did not permit corporations to indemnify their directors or officers;
however, it did not initially take off because corporations did not see
D&O personal liability as a significant risk.119 While state legislatures
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WILLIS HRH, EXECUTIVE RISKS ALERT: A-SIDE D&O FAQ 1 (June 2009), available
at http://www.willis.com/Documents/Publications/Services/Executive_Risks/2009/Execut
ive_Risks_Alert_-_0609_-_A-Side_FAQs.pdf.
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (West 2014); see also Sawicki et al., supra note
105, at 609.
117. Sawicki et al., supra note 105, at 609.
118. Id.
119. DAVID GISCHE & MEREDITH WERNER, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, DIRECTORS AND
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

44

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 19

began permitting corporate indemnification in the 1940s and 1950s,120
D&O personal liability protection—both indemnification agreements
and insurance policies—did not become common until the 1960s.121
Two 1968 decisions122 held directors and officers personally liable
despite not having profited personally from their behavior, ushering in a
new world of director and officer liability.123 D&O insurance policies
became more popular124 as corporations were forced to recognize the
exposure that their directors and officers faced.125 The percentage of
major corporations carrying D&O insurance grew from approximately
10% in the early 1960s to 70–80% in 1971.126 Today, almost all
corporations, including banks, carry D&O insurance policies as
additional protection for their directors and officers.127
Corporations purchase D&O insurance policies to protect
directors and officers from personal liability arising from conduct
executed in their official capacity.128 Policies not only protect the
directors and officers, but also the corporation itself, as these policies
cover claims that the company might otherwise have to pay on behalf of
its executives.129
D&O insurance policies may contain three “sides,” or types, of
coverage.130 The traditional policy, however, is only composed of two
sides: Side A and Side B coverage.131 Side A coverage (the only type
that applies to directors and officers) protects directors and officers
against claims that the corporation is legally prohibited against or
OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE: AN OVERVIEW 1 (June 2011).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (holding that Texas Gulf and Sulfur and thirteen of its directors, officers, and
employees violated Rule 10b-5).
123. Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ & Officers’ Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 21–22 (1989).
124. GISCHE & WERNER, supra note 119, at 1.
125. Id.
126. Romano, supra note 123.
127. Id.
128. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 494
(2007).
129. Id.
130. Christine Kang, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance: Ordinary Corporate Expense
or Valuable Signaling Device?, STAN. U. DEP’T OF ECON. (2011).
131. BAILEY CAVALIERI LLC, D&O POLICY COMMENTARY 3.
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feasibly incapable of indemnifying the director or officer.132 Because it
reaches non-indemnifiable claims and goes beyond the traditional D&O
coverage, Side A coverage is known as “Broad Form” coverage.133
Side A coverage also fills any gaps in indemnification created by state
carve-out statutory exceptions, which explicitly prohibit indemnification
in some circumstances.134
Side B coverage is also included in typical D&O insurance
policies.135 Rather than offering protection for the bank’s officers and
directors, however, Side B coverage protects the bank’s finances.136
Side B coverage reimburses the corporation for its losses in the event
that the corporation has to indemnify a director or officer for claims
brought against her.137 Yet it does not offer the corporation protection
for claims brought against the corporation itself.138 Side C coverage
does provide protection for claims brought by the bank against itself and
is therefore often added to the traditional coverage.139
C.

Weaknesses in D&O Insurance Policies

While D&O insurance policies provide many benefits for
directors, they also contain some weaknesses, which have worsened
since the 2008 financial crisis.140 First, the interaction between the three
types of coverage can create financial risk for bank executives.141 Most
claims paid out under D&O insurance policies are under Side B or C
coverage, leaving the policy limit depleted, and directors at risk.142
Secondly, D&O insurance policies can be frozen during a bank’s

132. Stephen J. Weiss & Thomas H. Bentz, Jr., Dedicated Limit D&O Insurance: An
Abbreviated Guide to the Policies That Protect the Personal Assets of Directors and to the
Officers, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, July 2007, at 29.
133. WILLIS HRH, supra note 115.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Weiss & Bentz, supra note 132, at 29.
137. GISCHE & WERNER, supra note 119, at 3.
138. Id.
139. BAILEY CAVALIERI LLC, supra note 130, at 3.
140. See, e.g., Benoit Carlier, Impact of the Crisis on D&O SOLI Policies, HUXLEY
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. (June 2014), http://www.huxley.com/insights-news/insights/impactof-the-crisis-on-d-o-and-soli-policies.
141. Weiss & Bentz, supra note 132.
142. Id.
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receivership because they are technically assets of the bank.143 In these
situations, the once fully insured director is left to fend for herself.144
Although “order of payment” provisions, which prioritize directors and
officers over the corporation in terms of policy payouts, are often
included in insurance policies, some question their effectiveness
because the provision often applies only if the payments to the director
and corporation are simultaneous.145
Moreover, policy exclusions may leave directors without
protection.146 Although D&O policies typically cover losses arising out
of compensatory damages, settlement amounts, and legal fees,147 this
coverage is typically limited by three significant exclusions: (1) fraud;
(2) prior claims; and (3) insured versus insured.148 First, the “fraud”
exclusion applies to claims alleging actual fraud or personal enrichment
by the director.149 The second exclusion, for “prior claims,” bars
protection against claims “either noticed or pending prior to the
commencement of the policy period.”150 Finally, the “insured versus
insured” exclusion states that insurers do not have to pay damages when
two people covered by the same policy sue each other.151
Since the 2008 financial crisis, changes in D&O insurance
policies have resulted in even less director coverage.152 Many D&O
insurance companies have experienced a decline in profit since the 2008
financial crisis due to the cost of defending against and settling
claims.153 As a result, these companies have now adopted stricter
acceptance criteria, making D&O insurance policies harder to
acquire.154 The cost of D&O insurance coverage also increased
immediately following the crisis, though there is some suggestion that
this spike in coverage costs has now leveled off.155 D&O insurance
Id.
Id.
BAILEY CAVALIERI LLC, supra note 130, at 2.
Baker & Griffith, supra note 128, at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cumming, supra note 95, at 3.
Benoit Carlier, Impact of the Crisis on D&O SOLI Policies, HUXLEY BANKING &
FINANCIAL SERVICES (2014).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Joanna Page, Roundtable: Risks Facing Directors and Officers, FINANCIER
143.
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companies have also increased the exclusionary terms in D&O
policies.156
For example, the “insured versus insured” exclusion has been
widened to prohibit coverage of directors and officers who face FDIC
professional liability suits.157 In 2013, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that the exclusion prohibits carriers
from covering officers and directors sued by the FDIC as well.158 For a
bank with a traditional D&O insurance policy that covers both directors
and the bank itself, an FDIC-as-receiver suit against the bank’s directors
is ultimately an “insured versus insured” suit because the FDIC is acting
as the bank.159 This creates a gaping hole in policy coverage for the
average bank, as D&O insurance policies are now prohibited from
covering directors and officers sued by the FDIC.160
VI. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF INCREASED BANK DIRECTOR LIABILITY
For shareholders, there are significant advantages of holding
bank directors personally liable for their decisions.161 First and
foremost, potential personal liability may further incentivize directors to
prioritize compliance with federal regulations.162 Banks have responded
to stronger regulatory enforcement with enhanced compliance programs
and an increased focus on risk exposure.163 Additionally, increased risk
of personal liability creates an incentive for banks and their directors to

WORLDWIDE MAG., Aug. 2013.
156. MITCHELL J. AUSLANDER ET AL., WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, FDIC ISSUES
ADVISORY STATEMENT REGARDING D&O INSURANCE POLICIES, EXCLUSIONS, AND
INDEMNIFICATION FOR CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES 1 (Oct. 2013).
157. Cumming, supra note 95, at 3.
158. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Miller, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (N.D. Ga. 2013); Kevin
LaCroix, D&O Insurance: Insured vs. Insured Exclusion Unambiguously Precludes
Coverage for FDIC Failed Bank Lawsuit, THE D&O DIARY (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/d-o-insurance/do-insurance-insured-vsinsured-exclusion-unambiguously-precludes-coverage-for-fdic-failed-bank-lawsuit/;
Cumming, supra note 95, at 3.
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2014),
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http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/04/articles/director-and-officer-liability/bsaamlenforcement-trends-and-do-liability/.
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improve their corporate governance policies.164 Corporations with
histories of poor corporate governance are often forced to pay higher
D&O insurance premiums because of the increased risk of coverage.165
Directors are negatively affected by the increased risk of
personal financial liability.166 After the 2008 financial crisis, “[i]t is
now a much more serious responsibility to take on the role of director
for any regulated entity”167 because a director of a financial entity “is
placing him or herself in the frame for very focused attention by
regulators.”168
Additional, though indirect, negative implications of personal
liability for directors are the circular process of heightened liability,
more extensive D&O insurance policies, and the FDIC’s decision to
bring suit where there are reachable D&O insurance policies.169 In a
situation in which the FDIC has been appointed as receiver of a bank,
the FDIC’s analysis of whether or not to pursue a claim takes into
Therefore, a heightened-liability
account potential recovery.170
atmosphere that leads banks to arm themselves with extensive D&O
insurance policies could actually make the FDIC more likely to pursue a
claim against a director because of the increased potential recovery.171
The increased risk of personal liability may also make it
difficult for companies to recruit qualified directors.172 A recent survey
of 2,000 banks and savings institutions stated that in the past five years,
24.5% of respondents said that they had a director resign or refuse to
serve on the board itself or on the board’s bank loan committee due to
fear of personal liability.173 This fear is exacerbated by a lack of
information and transparency concerning the source of payment in
164. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1181 (2006).
165. Id.
166. Page, supra note 155, at 4.
167. Id. at 9.
168. Id.
169. Sanjai Bhaga et al., Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The
Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54 J. RISK & INS. 721, 722 (1987).
170. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 16, at 2.
171. Id.
172. Laursen, supra note 161.
173. AABD Survey Results on Measuring Bank Director Fear of Personal Liability Are
Not Good News, AM. ASS’N OF BANK DIRECTORS (April 9, 2014), http://aabd.org/aabdsurvey-results-measuring-bank-director-fear-personal-liability-good-news/.
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FDIC settlements, as directors do not know the percentage paid by
D&O insurance policies in comparison to director personal
contributions.174 Adding to the uncertainty and distress is the damage to
a director’s reputation, career, and future earnings, all of which are not
compensable by insurance.175 The increased number of FDIC
professional liability suits along with the uncertainty of actual director
out-of-pocket expenses have combined to make “bank directors and
prospects . . . more concerned than ever about the extent of D&O
coverage,”176 and have made it increasingly difficult for banks to recruit
and keep highly qualified directors.177
Also of concern is the potential for less innovation and positive
development within banks as directors focus more on self-preservation
and less on good, but potentially risky, business decisions.178 In a
business environment which often reveres a daring and inventive
approach to firm strategy and development, the mentality of an underprotected director is at odds with the bold approach demanded by the
market and shareholders.179 As innovation often comes with a higher
degree of risk than more traditional and conservative approaches,
directors whose personal finances are at stake may be less willing to
make innovative choices,180 and the long-term health and success of the
bank could be negatively effected as a result.181
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
While U.S. consumers and regulators have been calling for
heightened personal liability since the 2008 financial crisis, it is clear
that the overall effects of increased personal liability are negative. To
address the disparity among these desires and the practical effects, the
industry should implement a system that has the same effect of director
Cumming, supra note 95, at 2.
Id.
Page, supra note 155.
Cumming, supra note 95, at 3.
Kevin L. Petrasic et al., Getting Personal-Regulators’ Drumbeat Warns of a New
Era of Individual Responsibility, 102 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 783, 785 (May 5,
2014).
179. See Bhaga, supra note 169.
180. Raul J. Palabrica, Directors and Officers Insurance, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER (Jul. 14,
2014, 12:41 AM), http://business.inquirer.net/174621/directors-and-officers-insurance.
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personal liability from consumer and regulator standpoints while still
offering directors some protection. This system should involve an
increase in accountability and transparency at the executive level
through strengthening corporate governance practices and publicizing
re-designed corporate governance indices.182
Improving corporate governance systems within financial
institutions is a key component of increasing accountability and
promoting cultures that emphasize responsible practices.183 Efforts by
financial institutions in this area so far have included elevating riskmanagement priorities by adding or promoting Chief Risk Officers and
establishing a risk committee within the board.184 In a recent survey of
major financial institutions, Ernst & Young found that 34% of
respondents have added board members with risk expertise.185 Other
proposed changes include separating the management and control
functions of banks and promoting long-term orientation of executive
compensation and decision-making in order to align directors’ personal
interests with those of the financial institution.186
In addition to improving corporate governance systems within
banks, the industry should redesign the corporate governance reports
used to evaluate these systems.187 Current corporate governance indices
use measurements such as shareholder rights and board entrenchment as
an indication of a corporation’s corporate environment,188 but more
thorough and routinely executed assessments by external parties could
provide more accurate insight into the performance of a corporation’s
182. Klaus J. Hopt, Better Governance of Financial Institutions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE
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J. CORP. FIN. 257 (2008).
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executives and policies.189 Such assessments would examine a
corporation’s culture and character, including executive compensation
policies and other incentive practices, executive turnover, and internal
controls such as revenue recognition procedures.190 These factors,
which are commonly used by D&O liability insurers to decide which
corporations they will insure,191 are considered to be “at least as
important as and perhaps more important than other, more readily
observable governance factors in assessing director liability risk.”192
These more in-depth and focused assessments should then be
made public to shareholders and the market regularly, in order to allow
investors to make more informed investment decisions, and thereby
create a market valuation of banks that consistently incorporates
unbiased corporate governance information.193 Investors will not only
benefit from corporate governance indices through access to reliable
information, but it will also incentivize banks to maintain strong
corporate governance systems.194 Emphasizing corporate governance
policies will increase internal stability and releasing these redesigned
corporate governance indices will provide banks with an opportunity to
differentiate themselves from their peers in the market, as well as
potentially increasing access to credit.195
Although increasing accountability and responsibility among
directors and officers is critical, pursuing this objective through director
and officer personal liability produces negative effects for directors,
shareholders, and firms. The same goal of executive accountability and
responsibility can be achieved by focusing instead on corporate
governance practices and policies implemented by financial institutions
as well as by allowing access to reliable and in-depth information
regarding these practices for the firm’s shareholders and general
investors in the market.
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